Were lockdowns justified? A return to the facts and evidence.

Were governments justified in imposing lockdowns to contain the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic? We argue that a convincing answer to this question is to date wanting, by critically analyzing the factual basis of a recent paper, "How Government Leaders Violated Their Epistemic Duties During the SARS-CoV-2 Crisis" (Winsberg, Brennan, and Suprenant 2020). In their paper, Winsberg, Brennan, and Suprenant argue that government leaders did not, at the beginning of the pandemic, meet the epistemic requirements necessitated to impose lockdowns. We focus on Winsberg, Brennan, and Suprenant's contentions that knowledge about COVID-19 resultant projections were inadequate; that epidemiologists were biased in their estimates of relevant figures; that there was insufficient evidence supporting the efficacy of lockdowns; and that lockdowns cause more harm than good. We argue that none of these claims are sufficiently supported by evidence, thus impairing their case against lockdowns, and leaving open the question of whether lockdowns were justified.

The Epistemic Duties of Philosophers: An Addendum.

In "Were Lockdowns Justified? A Return to the Facts and Evidence", we argue that Eric Winsberg, Jason Brennan and Chris Surprenant fail to make their case that initial COVID-19 lockdowns were unjustified, due to the fact their argument rests on erroneous factual claims. As is made clear by a response in this volume, the authors mistakenly take us to have been defending the imposition of lockdowns. Here, we clarify the aims of our original paper, and emphasise the importance of getting the facts right when making philosophical arguments in such a contentious domain.

Three Ways in Which Pandemic Models May Perform a Pandemic

Abstract: Models not only represent but may also influence their targets in important ways. While models' abilities to influence outcomes has been studied in the context of economic models, often under the label 'per-formativity', we argue that this phenomenon also pertains to epidemiological models, such as those used for forecasting the trajectory of the Covid-19 pandemic. After identifying three ways in which a model by the Covid-19 Response Team at Imperial College London (Ferguson et al. 2020) may have influenced scientific advice, policy, and individual responses, we consider the implications of epidemiological models' performative capacities. We argue, first, that performativity may impair models' ability to successfully predict the course of an epidemic;but second, that it may provide an additional sense in which these models can be successful, namely by changing the course of an epidemic.

[On the ethics of corona apps]. / Mit Kontaktdaten gegen die Pandemie: Zur Ethik von Corona Warn-Apps.

Definition of the problem: In spring 2020, as much of the world was emerging from widespread "lockdowns" as an emergency measure to combat the spread of SARS-CoV­2, there was sustained discussion about how to lift measures while preventing further waves of the virus and the need for further lockdowns. One strategy that attracted significant attention was the use of digital contact-tracing apps to quickly alert users of possible exposure to the virus, and to direct them into quarantine. The initially high expectations placed upon this strategy were not met-despite the implementation of a digital contact-tracing app in Germany, further restrictions have been placed on the general population in response to further waves of the virus. We consider how digital contact tracing might have been made more effective. Arguments: We argue that there is a conflict between collecting as little data as possible, and more effective epidemic control. In contrast to the "Corona-Warn-App" that was implemented in Germany, an app that stored more information on a central server (a so-called "centralized" app) had the potential to significantly decrease viral spread. We then look at the privacy-based arguments against the centralized storage of information, suggesting that "decentralized" systems have privacy problems of their own. Results: The German debate on digital contact tracing apps was quickly dominated by privacy concerns, to the detriment of other ethical factors such as enhancing potential effectiveness. Furthermore, the potential problems with privacy inherent in decentralized apps were obscured in the discussion. Once we recognize these two aspects, we can see that there is an argument to be made for preferring centralized digital contact-tracing apps.

Privacy versus Public Health? A Reassessment of Centralised and Decentralised Digital Contact Tracing.

At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, high hopes were placed on digital contact tracing. Digital contact tracing apps can now be downloaded in many countries, but as further waves of COVID-19 tear through much of the northern hemisphere, these apps are playing a less important role in interrupting chains of infection than anticipated. We argue that one of the reasons for this is that most countries have opted for decentralised apps, which cannot provide a means of rapidly informing users of likely infections while avoiding too many false positive reports. Centralised apps, in contrast, have the potential to do this. But policy making was influenced by public debates about the right app configuration, which have tended to focus heavily on privacy, and are driven by the assumption that decentralised apps are "privacy preserving by design". We show that both types of apps are in fact vulnerable to privacy breaches, and, drawing on principles from safety engineering and risk analysis, compare the risks of centralised and decentralised systems along two dimensions, namely the probability of possible breaches and their severity. We conclude that a centralised app may in fact minimise overall ethical risk, and contend that we must reassess our approach to digital contact tracing, and should, more generally, be cautious about a myopic focus on privacy when conducting ethical assessments of data technologies.

Without a trace: Why did corona apps fail?

At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, high hopes were put on digital contact tracing, using mobile phone apps to record and immediately notify contacts when a user reports as infected. Such apps can now be downloaded in many countries, but as second waves of COVID-19 are raging, these apps are playing a less important role than anticipated. We argue that this is because most countries have opted for app configurations that cannot provide a means of rapidly informing users of likely infections while avoiding too many false positive reports. Mathematical modelling suggests that differently configured apps have the potential to do this. These require, however, that some pseudonymised data be stored on a central server, which privacy advocates have cautioned against. We contend that their influential arguments are subject to two fallacies. First, they have tended to one-sidedly focus on the risks that centralised data storage entails for privacy, while paying insufficient attention to the fact that inefficient contact tracing involves ethical risks too. Second, while the envisioned system does entail risks of breaches, such risks are also present in decentralised systems, which have been falsely presented as 'privacy preserving by design'. When these points are understood, it becomes clear that we must rethink our approach to digital contact tracing in our fight against COVID-19.

How to overcome lockdown: selective isolation versus contact tracing.

At this stage of the COVID-19 pandemic, two policy aims are imperative: avoiding the need for a general lockdown of the population, with all its economic, social and health costs, and preventing the healthcare system from being overwhelmed by the unchecked spread of infection. Achieving these two aims requires the consideration of unpalatable measures. Julian Savulescu and James Cameron argue that mandatory isolation of the elderly is justified under these circumstances, as they are at increased risk of becoming severely ill from COVID-19, and are thus likely to put disproportionate strain on limited healthcare resources. However, their arguments for this strategy are contingent on the lack of viable alternatives. We suggest that there is a possible alternative: a mandatory, centralised contact-tracing app. We argue that this strategy is ethically preferable to the selective isolation of the elderly, because it does not target members of a certain group, relying instead on the movements of each individual, and because it avoids the extended isolation of certain members of the society. Although this type of contact-tracing app has its drawbacks, we contend that this measure warrants serious consideration.